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Abstract:  This study investigates risk factor disclosures under the voluntary, incentive-based 
disclosure regime provided by the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act and the SEC’s subsequent disclosure mandate.  Firms subject to greater litigation 
risk disclose more risk factors, update the language more from year-to-year, and use more 
readable language than firms with lower litigation risk.  These differences in the quality of 
disclosure are pronounced in the voluntary disclosure regime, but converge following the SEC 
mandate.  Consistent with these findings, the risk factor disclosures of high litigation risk firms 
are significantly more informative about systematic and idiosyncratic firm risk when disclosure 
is voluntary but not when disclosure is mandated.  Overall, the results suggest that for some 
firms voluntary disclosure of risk factors is not a substitute for a regulatory mandate. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Theories of voluntary disclosure emphasize that managers generally are eager to share 
their firms’ positive outlook, but they may be less forthcoming with bad news.  Empirical 
evidence supports this proposition; for example, Kothari et al. (2009) finds that managers delay 
the release of bad news to investors.  What about the potential for bad news?  Investors assessing 
the value of a firm’s securities are interested in the likelihood of both good and bad outcomes in 
forecasting the firm’s future cash flows.  In the extreme, positive projections could be rendered 
misleading by the omission of potential risks that might thwart the firm’s plans and aspirations.   
 This paper examines public companies’ disclosure of risk factors that are meant to inform 
investors about risks and uncertainties.  In 1995, Congress created a legal incentive to disclose 
risk factors as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).  The PSLRA’s safe 
harbor provision shields firms from liability for forward-looking statements provided they are 
accompanied by “meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could 
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward looking statement.”  The 
voluntary disclosure of risk factors provides a direct means for firms to reduce the often 
substantial expected costs of securities fraud class actions.  Thus, the safe harbor provides an 
important incentive for public companies to disclose risk factors, but that incentive is likely to 
vary with firms’ perception of their potential vulnerability to securities class actions. 
 Risk factor disclosure shifted from a voluntary, incentive-based regime to a mandatory 
one in 2005 when the SEC added Item 1A to Form 10-K, requiring most public companies to 
disclose risk factors annually and update them quarterly as necessary in Form 10-Q.  In adopting 
the new rule, the SEC acknowledged that some issuers had already been disclosing risk factors to 
take advantage of the PSLRA’s safe harbor. 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 104 [2014]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/104
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447066 
2 
 
 We study how these two changes in the law affect the disclosure of risk factors.  We 
conjecture that litigation risk plays an important role in firms’ disclosure practices, particularly 
during the voluntary disclosure period from 1996 to 2005.  Further, we expect that the SEC’s 
2005 disclosure mandate will narrow, but not necessarily close, the gap between firms with a 
litigation–related incentive to provide risk factor disclosure and those compelled to  disclose 
because of the mandate.  Finally, we expect that differences in the quality of the disclosure are 
likely to affect its usefulness to investors in assessing firm risk. 
To conduct our analyses, we construct a sample of firms with high ex-ante risk of being 
sued in a securities fraud class action and a sample with low ex-ante risk of being sued.  We 
examine risk factors disclosed by these firms in annual reports filed with the SEC from 1996-
2010 using three metrics designed to capture characteristics of “meaningful” disclosure 
suggested by the PSLRA’s legislative history, subsequent court decisions, and the SEC: (i) the 
amount of risk factor disclosure, measured with the number of words; (ii) the extent to which the 
risk factors are updated year-to-year, measured with the Resemblance score of text similarity; 
and (iii) the readability of the risk factors, measured using the Fog index of text complexity.  All 
else equal, risk factor disclosure is more “meaningful” if it is comprehensive, if it is not a 
boilerplate copy from the prior year, and if it can be understood by the average investor. 
We use these disclosure metrics to investigate whether firms at greater risk of securities 
fraud lawsuits provide more “meaningful” risk factor disclosure, and how the SEC’s 2005 
mandate affects this disclosure.  Controlling for other factors that could affect the disclosure 
decision, we find that, on average, firms with greater litigation risk provide more risk factor 
disclosure, revise their disclosure more from year-to-year, and use more readable language than 
firms with low litigation risk.  When we allow these effects to vary with the disclosure regime, 
3
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we find significant differences in disclosure between high and low risk firms in the voluntary 
regime.  After the SEC mandate in 2005, however, firms with low litigation risk increase the 
amount of risk factor disclosure, revise it more extensively each year, and use more readable 
language, thus leading to more similar disclosure across the two groups of firms. 
Our conclusion is that the SEC’s mandate had a material effect on the disclosure 
decisions of companies that had relatively little incentive to provide meaningful disclosure under 
the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision alone.  This is not to say, however, that litigation-related 
disclosure incentives have no role to play in the mandatory disclosure regime.  We find that 
firms with high litigation risk continue to provide a significantly greater amount of risk factor 
disclosure in the mandatory regime.  Moreover, in both disclosure regimes, high risk firms 
disclose significantly more risk factor information as litigation risk increases.   
We also find evidence that risk factor disclosures provide information useful to investors 
in assessing future firm risk, although here again the findings vary predictably with firms’ 
disclosure incentives and the disclosure regime.  For firms with high litigation risk and hence 
greater incentive to provide meaningful disclosure, one-year-ahead beta and stock return 
volatility are increasing in the unexpected portion of risk factor disclosure.  Moreover, in the 
voluntary disclosure regime, firms with high litigation risk provide risk factor disclosures that are 
significantly more informative about systematic and idiosyncratic risk than firms with low 
litigation risk.  Subsequent to the SEC mandate, however, there is no statistical difference, 
consistent with a convergence in the meaningfulness of risk factor disclosures.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with managers responding to high ex ante litigation 
risk with risk factor disclosures designed to reduce the expected costs of litigation.  In contrast, 
low risk firms perceiving little net benefit to disclosure did not provide meaningful risk factor 
4
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disclosure until compelled to do so by the SEC.  Understanding risk factor disclosures is 
important to managers and legal counsel responsible for formulating a disclosure strategy, to 
regulators and courts charged with evaluating the quality of these disclosures, and to investors 
interested in assessing the risks posed by firms.   
 We proceed as follows.  Section 2 provides institutional background on the evolution of 
risk factor disclosures in regulatory filings.  Section 3 surveys related research.  Section 4 
develops our hypotheses.  Section 5 describes our research design, and Section 6 presents the 
results of our empirical tests.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Evolution of Risk Factor Disclosures  
For many years, risk factors were disclosed primarily by domestic companies registering 
public offerings on Form S-1 and foreign private issuers on Form 20-F annual reports.  Over the 
past two decades, two regulatory changes progressively broadened the set of firms disclosing risk 
factors.  The first, the enactment of the PSLRA in December 1995, provided an incentive to 
voluntarily disclose risk factors for firms wishing to avail themselves of its statutory safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements.
1
  Ten years later in December 2005, the SEC approved a rule 
mandating disclosure of risk factors in periodic filings.  This section discusses the regulatory 
background and requirements of these two rule changes affecting risk factor disclosures. 
2.1 PSLRA Safe Harbor and the Voluntary Disclosure of Risk Factors 
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress expressed concern that securities class actions were 
discouraging managers from providing forward-looking information to investors.  The PSLRA 
addresses that issue by creating a statutory safe harbor protecting written or oral statements that 
are identified as forward-looking and “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
                                                 
1
 Although the SEC adopted a limited safe harbor for forward-looking disclosures in 1979, its reach is narrow, 
providing very limited protection against liability. 
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identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the 
forward looking statement.”2  The phrase “accompanied by” has been interpreted loosely by the 
courts, allowing firms to invoke the safe harbor by including language regarding risk factors in 
their periodic filings with the SEC and incorporating that disclosure by reference in subsequent 
communications containing forward-looking statements.
3
 
The statute does not explicitly define, however, what constitutes a “meaningful” 
cautionary statement, although legislative history and court decisions provide some insights.  In 
particular, the Conference Report (1995) states that “cautionary statements must convey 
substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially 
from those projected in the forward-looking statements.”  Thus, courts have concluded that a 
“cursory” discussion of risk factors will not invoke the protections of the safe harbor.4   
The Conference Report (1995) also states that “boilerplate warnings will not suffice.”  
For the discussion of risk factors to be meaningful, it must change as the firm’s circumstances 
change.  Accordingly, courts have ruled that when a firm’s “cautionary language remained fixed 
even as the risks changed,” it was insufficient to warrant the protection of the safe harbor.5  
Finally, courts have ruled that cautionary risk factor statements will not satisfy the safe harbor’s 
requirements if they are “too cryptic to be meaningful to the average investor.”6  Taken together, 
the prescriptions found in the PSLRA’s legislative history and court decisions suggest that 
cautionary statements regarding risk factors should be thorough, should not cut and paste 
                                                 
2
 See Johnson et al. (2000; 2001) for additional discussion of the PSLRA’s legislative history and the safe harbor. 
3
 For example, firms will often reference the risk factors discussed in their securities filings in their corporate press 
releases or investor conference calls. 
4
 See, for example, Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 559 (6
th
 Cir. 2001) and Yanek v. Staar Surgical Co., 388 
F.Supp.2d 1110, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  The statute does not, however, require a firm to disclose all risk factors that 
could cause future results to differ from those projected, or the particular risk factor that ultimately causes the 
forward-looking statement to be in error. See Conference Report (1995) and Harris v. IVAX, Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 
807 (11
th
 Cir. 1999). 
5
 Asher v. Baxter International, Inc. 377 F.3d 727 (7
th
 Cir. 2004). 
6
 In re Nike, Inc. Sec. Litig., 181 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172 (D. Or.2002). 
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boilerplate language from the preceding year, and should be written in language easily 
understood by the average investor.  
2.2 SEC Risk Factor Disclosure Mandate  
 In 2005, the SEC streamlined considerably the public offering process under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (SEC 2005).  In addition to these changes, the SEC also imposed several 
new disclosure requirements on public companies pursuant to the Exchange Act.  Notable for our 
purposes is a new requirement that most public companies disclose the most significant factors 
that may adversely affect the issuer’s business, operations, industry, financial position, or its 
future financial performance.  The risk factors are required to be presented in Item 1A of Form 
10-K and must be updated quarterly in the 10-Q to reflect material changes from previously 
disclosed risks.7 
The SEC rule does not require particular risk factors be disclosed.  Instead, it notes that 
disclosures should be clearly written in everyday language investors can read and understand, in 
accordance with the SEC’s plain English standards, and should avoid “boilerplate” discussion of 
risks that could affect any issuer.  Consistent with these prescriptions, the SEC has called on 
companies to provide more information on the risks they face and to avoid “copying and 
pasting” from earlier filings (Johnson 2010).  Thus, as under the PSLRA, risk factor disclosures 
should be thorough, updated year-to-year, and readable.  In our research design discussed below, 
we develop measures to capture these three facets of risk factor disclosures. 
 
                                                 
7
 Smaller reporting companies and asset-backed issuers are excluded from the disclosure requirement are.  At the 
time the SEC implemented securities offering reform, small public companies were allowed to follow the reduced 
disclosure requirements of Regulation S-B.  The Smaller Reporting Company rule, adopted by the SEC effective 
February 4, 2008, consolidated Regulation S-B into Regulation S-K and effectively expanded the number of smaller 
companies eligible to follow the reduced disclosure requirements.  Firms identifying themselves as “smaller 
reporting companies” may adopt reduced disclosure requirements on an item-by-item basis, including the option to 
forego Item 1A risk factor disclosures. 
7
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3.  Related Research 
  This paper contributes to our understanding of how law and regulation shape managers’ 
response to disclosure incentives and mandates.  In particular, we contribute to three inter-related 
streams of literature regarding: (1) voluntary versus mandatory disclosure; (2) risk disclosures; 
and (3) the link between disclosure and litigation risk. 
3.1 Voluntary versus Mandatory Disclosure 
 The earliest work on disclosure regulation examines the market reaction to the passage of 
the Securities Act of 1933, which allows the SEC to mandate disclosure in public offerings.  
Stigler (1964) and Jarrell (1981) find no evidence that securities offered after the Securities Act 
provide investors with greater returns, although they do find that post-legislation offerings 
demonstrate less variance.  Less variance may be evidence that investors are better able to assess 
risk with mandatory disclosure, or it may simply reflect riskier offerings moving to private 
placements (Benston, 1969; Jarrell, 1981; Simon, 1989).   
Other work examines the extension of mandatory disclosure requirements to new 
segments of the capital markets.  Ferrell (2003) investigates the effect of the 1964 extension of 
periodic disclosures required under the Exchange Act to the over-the-counter market.  He finds 
that the changes are associated with a significant reduction in volatility for the affected 
securities.  Greenstone et al. (2006) shows positive abnormal stock returns and an increase in 
operating performance for firms brought in to the disclosure regime by the 1964 amendments.  
Related to this work, Bushee and Leuz (2005) finds that the extension of the Exchange Act 
disclosure requirements to the OTC-Bulletin Board in 1999 results in positive abnormal returns 
for OTC-BB firms already subject to the disclosure requirements, suggesting externality effects 
from disclosure.  However, they also find that the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements 
8
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 104 [2014]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/104
8 
 
forced a large number of firms into the less regulated Pink Sheets.  Moreover, the OTC firms that 
chose to comply with the new disclosure requirements to continue trading on the OTC-BB 
experienced, on average, negative abnormal returns.   
Although most research examines the imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements, 
Cheng et al. (2013) examines the SEC’s 2008 decision to exempt companies under $75 million 
in market capitalization from certain disclosure requirements.  They find that firms choosing to 
voluntarily continue such disclosures after the regulatory change nonetheless experience a drop 
in liquidity, although the decline is not as great as it is for firms that stop disclosing.  They 
interpret their results as supporting the argument that mandatory disclosure serves as a credible 
commitment device that perhaps cannot be duplicated by voluntary disclosure. 
3.2 Risk Disclosures 
Early research in this area examines mandatory quantitative disclosures detailing firms’ 
market risk exposures (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorion, 2002).  The findings 
show that these disclosures are correlated with market-based measures of risk and equity prices.  
More recent work uses textual analysis tools to analyze qualitative risk disclosures.  For 
example, Li (2006) counts the frequency of the word stems “risk” and “uncertain” over a sample 
period that pre-dates the risk factor disclosure mandate, 1993 to 2004, and finds that an increase 
in the risk sentiment of annual reports is associated with lower future earnings and equity returns.  
Kravet and Muslu (2013) counts the number of sentences containing risk-related keywords in 
corporate annual reports over a sample period that spans both the PSLRA safe harbor and the 
risk factor disclosure mandate, 1994 to 2007, and finds that increases in this measure are 
associated with increased stock return volatility and trading volume around the 10-K filing date, 
as well increased volatility of analyst forecast revisions.  Campbell et al. (2014) examines the 
9
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number of words and specific keywords in Item 1A over the post-mandate period, 2005-2008, 
and finds a positive association between the length of risk factor disclosures and post-disclosure 
market beta and stock return volatility. 
3.3 Litigation Risk and Disclosure 
The relation between litigation risk and disclosure is complex.  On the one hand, high 
litigation risk can reduce managers’ incentives to provide forecasts.  For example, Rogers and 
Van Buskirk (2009) finds that firms reduce disclosure in the immediate aftermath of a lawsuit 
filing.  Baginski et al. (2002) reports that firms in the U.S. issue fewer forecasts of both good and 
bad news than do firms in the less litigious Canadian environment.  Moreover, U.S. firms were 
significantly less likely to provide forecasts before the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision was 
enacted increasing protection for forward-looking disclosures (Johnson et al. 2001). 
On the other hand, when faced with bad news, managers have an incentive to provide an 
early warning of the earnings shortfall to reduce the likelihood and expected costs of litigation 
(Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995).  Although timely disclosure of bad news does not 
always deter the filing of a lawsuit (Francis et al. 1994), it can deter certain types of lawsuits 
(Field et al. 2005) and reduce the expected costs of resolving litigation (Skinner 1997). 
3.4 Contribution 
We extend the literature summarized above in several important directions.  We provide 
direct evidence on how a shift from a regime providing incentives for voluntary disclosure to one 
requiring disclosure affects the disclosed information and its usefulness to investors.  Prior 
research on disclosure regulation generally infers the consequences of a disclosure mandate from 
its capital market effects without directly linking the market response to disclosure practices and 
attributes under the alternative regimes.  Moreover, we also consider whether the requirement to 
10
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 104 [2014]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/104
10 
 
disclose an item affects the quality of disclosures for the firms that already voluntarily provide 
the information, an important issue that has not been addressed in the literature. 
With respect to our particular focus on risk factor disclosures, prior research does not 
consider the effects of changes in disclosure regime.  Moreover, these studies generally focus on 
a single disclosure property, most often the amount of disclosure, whereas we develop and test 
predictions for three complementary measures that explain variation in risk factor disclosures in 
general and in relation to MD&A. Finally, this work, and prior textual analysis research in 
general, gives little consideration to managers’ disclosure incentives (Li, 2010).  We examine the 
complementary role of legal incentives and regulatory mandates on risk factor disclosures.  
Moreover, the focus of litigation-related disclosure research has been on managements’ 
voluntary earnings forecasts.  In this paper, we turn our attention to incentives to disclose risk 
factors in corporate annual reports as a preemptive means of controlling firms’ exposure to 
litigation. 
4.  Hypothesis Development 
Based on the institutional background and prior research discussed above, we develop a 
series of hypotheses for our empirical tests.  In particular, we examine the association between 
the risk of securities fraud litigation and risk factor disclosures, firms’ response to the SEC’s 
2005 disclosure mandate, and the relevance of risk factor disclosures to investors. 
4.1 Litigation Risk and Risk Factors 
All else equal, the greater the probability of litigation, the greater the expected benefits 
from disclosing risk factors under the PSLRA.  Prior research presents empirical evidence 
consistent with the PSLRA’s safe harbor reducing expected legal costs.  For example, the 
likelihood an earnings warning will result in a lawsuit filing or an allegation of false or 
11
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misleading projections is significantly lower after enactment of the PSLRA (Johnson et al. 
2007), suggesting the safe harbor dissuades potential plaintiffs from pursuing disclosure-related 
complaints.  Moreover, lawsuits containing allegations of fraud in forward-looking statements 
are more likely to be dismissed in the post-PSLRA period (Pritchard and Sale 2005), which also 
reduces defendants’ legal costs from securities fraud class actions. 
For some firms, however, the expected legal benefits of risk factor disclosure are likely 
minimal.  Firms that are unlikely to be sued have little incentive to craft a meaningful risk factor 
discussion, especially when weighed against the potential business and personal costs of 
disclosure.  Although the marginal administrative costs of formulating the disclosure are likely 
slight relative to the overall costs of preparing the 10-K, managers face a range of incentives to 
withhold unfavorable information (Kothari et al. 2009).  Risk factors by their very nature convey 
information about a firm’s vulnerabilities and potential adverse outcomes which could be 
exploited by competitors and investors, leading to negative career consequences for managers.  
Trading off these costs against the legal benefits of disclosure, firms are likely to minimize risk 
factors unless there is a nontrivial probability of being sued.
8
     
To trigger safe harbor protection, risk factors must be “meaningful.”  We posit that firms 
at greater risk of litigation will provide more “meaningful” risk factor disclosure.  As discussed 
above, the Conference Report (1995) states that risk factors must convey “substantive 
information.”  Given this prescription, and the courts’ interpretation that risk factors are not 
meaningful if they are “cursory,” we expect firms with higher litigation risk to provide more risk 
factor disclosure: 
H1a:  Firms at greater risk of litigation provide more risk factor disclosure. 
 
                                                 
8
 We are not aware of any a priori reason to expect that the costs of disclosure, whether administrative, proprietary, 
or personal, are related to the ex-ante probability of being sued.   
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The Conference Report (1995) also states that “boilerplate warnings” repeated from year 
to year are inadequate.  Courts assessing the adequacy of firms’ risk factors examine whether 
firms update their disclosed risks to reflect the current operating environment.  The ordinary 
practice of managers and lawyers preparing SEC filings is to cut and paste from the previous 
filing, and then revise to reflect any developments in the business.  If the risk factors are not 
adequately updated, they are less likely to provide protection against suit.  Accordingly, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
H1b:  Firms at greater risk of litigation revise their risk factor disclosure more. 
 
Courts have also held that risk factors must be comprehensible to provide a meaningful 
warning.  As a result, they are likely to view risk factors that use excessive legalese or contain 
highly technical business terms as inadequate to secure safe harbor protection.  Thus, we posit a 
positive association between litigation risk and the readability of risk factor disclosure: 
H1c:  Firms at greater risk of litigation provide more readable risk factor disclosure. 
 
The risk of securities litigation is not static; firms may vary in their exposure as their 
business environment changes.  If firms with higher litigation risk have incentives to provide 
more meaningful risk factor disclosure, we expect an increase in litigation risk to trigger the 
disclosure of more risk factor information that is less boilerplate and more readable.  Moreover, 
we expect the sensitivity of risk factor disclosure to increases in litigation risk to be especially 
acute for firms already at a high risk of being sued, as marginal changes in litigation exposure for 
low risk firms are unlikely to subject them to a substantial risk of a lawsuit.  This line of 
reasoning leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: In response to an increase in litigation risk, firms at greater risk of litigation will 
provide more risk factor disclosure that is less boilerplate and more readable. 
 
13
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We do not expect firms to respond to a decrease in litigation risk with a corresponding 
decrease in risk factor disclosure.  Once a firm has identified and described a risk factor, the 
marginal cost of including it in subsequent filings is likely to be small.  Even if a risk factor no 
longer provides substantial benefit in terms of reducing litigation exposure, there is likely to be a 
presumption favoring its continuance unless the factor becomes obviously irrelevant, such as 
“Year 2000” risk disclosures in 2001 and beyond. 
4.2 Disclosure Regulation and Risk Factors  
 The SEC’s 2005 risk factors disclosure requirement made mandatory a category of 
disclosure that was previously voluntary, albeit with a legal incentive to disclose in the form of 
the PSLRA’s safe harbor.  Given that pre-existing incentive, however, the mandate likely had a 
differential effect on firms depending on what disclosure, if any, they had already been 
providing.  If our prior hypotheses are correct, firms with high litigation risk had an incentive to 
disclose meaningful risk factor information prior to the mandate.  Therefore, in the voluntary 
disclosure regime, we expect firms at greater risk of litigation to disclose significantly more risk 
factor information that is less boilerplate and more readable.  Because the SEC also wants 
companies to provide detailed risk factor information while avoiding boilerplate and complex 
language, as discussed above, we expect that the mandate will induce firms that previously had 
little incentive to disclose (i.e., firms with low litigation risk) to produce more meaningful risk 
factor disclosures.  Thus, in the mandatory disclosure regime, we expect the difference in the risk 
factor disclosures of high and low litigation risk firms to narrow or disappear.
9
  We summarize 
these predictions in our third hypothesis: 
                                                 
9
 This is not to suggest that the mandate would have no effect on high litigation risk firms that were previously 
disclosing risk factors.  The SEC’s adoption of a mandate implied that they would now be policing such disclosures 
through the review and comment process.  Thus, the disclosure mandate could induce even previously-disclosing 
firms to be more diligent.  Nevertheless, we expect any such changes to be small at the margin relative to the 
14
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H3a:  In the voluntary disclosure regime, firms at greater risk of litigation provide more 
risk factor disclosure that is less boilerplate and more readable. 
 
H3b:  In the mandatory disclosure regime, there is little or no difference in the attributes 
of meaningful risk factor disclosure (amount, boilerplate, and readability) between firms 
with high and low litigation risk. 
 
4.3 Risk Factors and Investors’ Risk Assessments 
Risk factor disclosures, if meaningful, should allow investors to make more precise 
estimates of the risks associated with firms’ expected future cash flows.  Thus, the attributes of 
meaningful risk factor disclosures discussed above should be positively associated with the 
market’s assessment of firm risk (i.e., beta and stock return volatility).  However, our prior 
hypotheses also suggest that meaningful risk factor disclosure varies systematically with firms’ 
disclosure incentives and the disclosure regime.  In particular, we posit that firms at greater risk 
of litigation provide more meaningful risk factor disclosures, particularly during the voluntary 
disclosure regime.  Thus, our final hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: The information content of risk factor disclosures is positively associated with the 
market’s assessment of firm risk, particularly for firms at high risk of litigation in the 
voluntary disclosure regime. 
 
5.  Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection 
 During the voluntary disclosure period, 1996-2004, firms did not report risk factors in a 
specific section of the 10-K, and hence there are no common markers indicating the beginning or 
end of the risk factor discussion that can be used to reliably extract this text using computer-
aided search and retrieval.  Because the risk factor text must be manually identified and 
collected, we select a sample of firms for testing.  To do this, we estimate firm-specific ex-ante 
                                                                                                                                                             
changes necessitated by the mandate for firms with low litigation risk. 
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litigation risk for each year in the voluntary disclosure period and then select two subsamples –– 
one with high litigation risk and the other with low litigation risk. 
 We discuss the litigation risk model in Appendix A.  The evidence indicates that only 
those observations in the top decile of estimated litigation risk have any substantive risk of being 
sued.  Therefore, for our High Risk sample, we randomly select 5% of firms from those that rank 
in the top decile in at least one year of the voluntary disclosure period, for a sample of 181 firms.  
The Low Risk sample consists of firms that never rank above decile 6 in the voluntary disclosure 
period.  We use this cutoff because the maximum estimated litigation risk for decile 6 (0.015) is 
less than the minimum for decile 10 (0.022), ensuring that litigation risk in the Low Risk sample 
does not exceed that of the High Risk firms.  We again randomly select 5% of the firms in this 
group, resulting in 112 Low Risk firms.  To examine the effects of the risk factor disclosure 
mandate, we follow the sample of High Risk and Low Risk firms through the mandatory 
disclosure period, 2005-2010, for which we again obtain firm-specific litigation risk estimates 
for each year using the model described in Appendix A. 
 Table 1 reports the distribution of sample observations by litigation risk decile.  By 
construction in the voluntary disclosure period, observations in the Low Risk sample never rank 
above decile 6.  Even so, two-thirds of the observations cluster in deciles 1-3.  Conversely, 
observations in the High Risk sample are skewed toward the highest risk deciles, with decile 10 
containing one-quarter of the observations, and deciles 8-10 more than half the sample.  Because 
we include all firm-years in our analysis, however, some observations fall into the lower deciles.  
The sample profile is similar in the mandatory disclosure period, suggesting that litigation risk is 
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relatively stable over time.  Specifically, observations in the Low Risk (High Risk) sample cluster 
in the extreme low (high) litigation risk deciles.
10
 
5.2 Risk Factor Disclosure Measures 
 For each firm-year in the sample, we obtain the annual filing from the SEC’s online 
EDGAR system and extract the risk factor text.  During the voluntary disclosure period, the 
location of the risk factors varies, but is typically found in either Item 7 (Management Discussion 
and Analysis) or Item 1 (Business).  During the mandatory disclosure period, the risk factors are 
located in Item 1A (Risk Factors).  We develop three proxies to measure the properties of firms’ 
risk factor disclosures discussed above in Section II. 
 To assess the amount of risk factor disclosure, we use the word count of the risk factors 
disclosure.  As shown in Figure 1, Panel A, disclosure by the High Risk sample increases steadily 
over the sample period, from a median of 265 words in 1996 to 6,602 words in 2010.  In 
contrast, disclosure by the Low Risk sample is relatively flat throughout the voluntary disclosure 
period, never exceeding 600 words at the median.  However, there is a sharp increase in the 
amount of disclosure beginning in 2005 with the risk factor disclosure mandate.  Even during the 
mandatory disclosure period, however, disclosure by the Low Risk sample is still typically less 
than half the level of the High Risk sample. 
 It is possible that the increase in the amount of risk factor disclosure over time reflects a 
general trend towards longer corporate disclosures (e.g., Francis et al. 2002; Li 2008) rather than 
a specific trend related to risk factors.  Similarly, the difference between the High Risk and Low 
Risk samples could be driven by differences in these firms’ general disclosure tendencies rather 
                                                 
10
 There are 30 observations in the Low Risk group that are in deciles 7-10 during the mandatory disclosure period.  
Because our objective is to study how firms’ disclosure policies evolve across regulatory regimes, we retain these 
observations in our primary tests.  Untabulated supplemental analysis reveals, however, that their exclusion does not 
alter inferences. 
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than by litigation risk.  Thus, we also examine the word count of risk factors relative to that of 
MD&A.
11
  For the High Risk sample, the results in Figure 1, Panel B reveal a rapid increase in 
the relative amount of risk factor disclosure until 2000, when it levels off at approximately 50 
percent of MD&A.  For the Low Risk sample, risk factors are approximately 10 percent of 
MD&A until 2005, but under the disclosure mandate quickly converge to the same relative level 
as the High Risk sample. 
 Our second measure assesses the extent to which risk factors merely repeat language 
from the prior year.  Theoretical and empirical work in linguistics shows that the frequency 
distribution of words in human languages is highly skewed; a few words are used very often but 
most words are used rarely (Manning and Schütze 1999).  This distinctive distribution is more 
pronounced for word bigrams (a sequence of two adjacent words) and even more so for word 
trigrams (a sequence of three adjacent words).
12
  If the probability of a word occurring is low, the 
probability of it occurring in conjunction with others is even lower.  Independently written 
documents, even if they are on the same or similar subjects or are written by the same author at 
different points in time, typically have few matching trigrams.
13
 
 To measure the extent to which risk factor disclosures are cut and paste from the prior 
year, we first convert each disclosure into a set of trigrams.  The set of trigrams in the reference 
document, denoted S(A), is then compared with that of the comparison document, denoted S(B), 
and the resemblance between the two documents is determined as follows: 
                                                 
11
 During the voluntary disclosure period, some firms disclose their risk factors in the MD&A section.  We exclude 
the risk factor language from the MD&A text in our analysis. 
12
 For example, the sentence “A storm is forecast for today” has four overlapping trigrams: (a storm is), (storm is 
forecast), (is forecast for), (forecast for today).   
13
 For example, Gibbon et al. (1997) reports that even in a sample of Wall Street Journal articles comprising over 38 
million words, 77% of trigrams occurred only once.  Lyon et al. (2001) investigates the use of n-grams as lexical 
features and finds that single words and bigrams have low power to identify similar text relative to trigrams.  The 
ability to detect similar text is reduced for n > 3. 
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S(A) S(B)
S(A) S(B)
Resemblance = 


,      (1) 
where 0 ≤ Resemblance ≤ 1.  Two identical documents have a Resemblance score of 1.  We 
focus our analysis on one-year Resemblance scores, i.e., a comparison of risk factor disclosures 
for firm i in year t relative to year t – 1.  The Resemblance score thus provides a simple and 
intuitive measure of text similarity that is grounded in linguistics theory. 
 Figure 2, Panel A compares Resemblance scores for the High Risk and Low Risk samples.  
As expected, Resemblance is systematically lower for the High Risk sample, indicating that these 
firms annually revise risk factor disclosures to a greater extent than Low Risk firms.
 14
  There is a 
sizeable drop in Resemblance, however, for the Low Risk sample in 2005, consistent with the 
dramatic increase in the amount of risk factor discussion by these firms to comply with the 
disclosure mandate shown in Figure 1.  The decline was short-lived, however, as Resemblance 
for the Low Risk sample quickly rebounded to its pre-2005 level.  There is also a smaller drop in 
Resemblance in 2005 for the High Risk sample, but the level is not outside of its historical range.  
Panel B compares the Resemblance of risk factors relative to that of MD&A.  The ratio is greater 
than one in all years for both the High Risk and Low Risk samples, indicating that risk factors are 
updated to a lesser extent than MD&A.  Nevertheless, there is relatively more boilerplate 
language in the risk factors of Low Risk firms throughout the voluntary disclosure period, only 
converging with the High Risk firms after the risk factor disclosure mandate. 
                                                 
14
 Nevertheless, the Resemblance scores in Figure 2 are quite high by usual standards; median Resemblance in the 
High (Low) Risk sample is approximately 0.61 (0.77).  To put these findings in context, we examine one-year 
Resemblance scores between firms, i.e., for firm i in year t relative to firm j in year t – 1.  For all permutations of 
firm pairings, mean (median) Resemblance is 0.02 (0.01); the 99th percentile is 0.07.  We find similar results for 
Resemblance between firms in the same year, i.e., for firms i and j in year t.  These results are comparable to 
findings in other settings (e.g., Lyon et al., 2001; Bao and Malcolm, 2006), where the average Resemblance score 
typically ranges between 0.01 and 0.03.  Thus, the results in Figure 2 indicate that the year-to-year Resemblance in 
firms’ risk factors is quite high, consistent with the SEC’s concerns about boilerplate disclosure.   
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 Our third measure assesses the readability of the risk factor disclosures.  Following prior 
research (e.g., Li 2008), we use the Fog Index of text complexity which measures readability as a 
function of syllables per word and words per sentence: 
0.40Fog = (words per sentence + percent of complex words)   ,      (2) 
where complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more.  Fog indicates the 
number of years of formal education a person of average intelligence would need to understand 
the text after reading it once, and thus a higher Fog score indicates a less readable document. 
 Figure 3, Panel A shows that High Risk firms generally provide more readable risk factor 
disclosures than Low Risk firms during the voluntary disclosure period.  Following the risk factor 
mandate, readability improves substantially for the Low Risk firms.  Conversely, there is some 
evidence that readability deteriorated for High Risk firms, although the level remained within its 
historical range.  Relative to MD&A, Panel B shows that the readability of risk factors for High 
Risk and Low Risk firms converged during the mandatory disclosure period.  In all years, 
however, risk factors are more difficult to read than MD&A, as evidenced by a ratio greater than 
one, consistent with the SEC’s concerns regarding the use of “legalese” in risk factors. 
 Overall, the graphical evidence supports our predictions regarding the incentives of High 
Risk firms to voluntarily provide meaningful risk factor disclosures under the PSLRA and the 
subsequent effects of the disclosure mandate on Low Risk firms.  We next develop the empirical 
models we use to formally test our hypotheses. 
5.3 Empirical Models 
 To examine the association between litigation risk and risk factor disclosures, we 
estimate the following regression model: 
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1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
Disclosure  Risk Disclosure_MDA Forward_MDA
ScaledDisclosure BigN LogMVE MTB
Delaware Restructure Segments
   
   
    
                      (3) 
where Disclosure indicates one of the three risk factor disclosure metrics discussed above, (i) 
Count, the natural log of one plus the number of words in the risk factors discussion, (ii) 
Resemblance, or (iii) Fog.  The main variable of interest is the litigation risk proxy, Risk, an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in the High Risk sample, and zero otherwise.  H1 
predicts that Risk is positively (negatively) associated with Count (Resemblance and Fog). 
We report results for two alternative specifications of equation (3).  The first specification 
pools all observations to estimate the average association between litigation risk and the three 
risk factor disclosure metrics across the sample period.  The second specification allows the 
coefficient estimate on Risk to vary for the voluntary and mandatory disclosure regimes.  To the 
extent that the disclosure mandate reduces or eliminates differences in firms’ risk factor 
disclosures, H3 predicts that the coefficient estimate on Risk in the mandatory disclosure period 
will be insignificant and/or less than the coefficient estimate in the voluntary disclosure period.   
To control for firms’ general disclosure tendencies, we include Disclosure_MDA which 
indicates one of the three disclosure metrics calculated using the firm’s MD&A (exclusive of any 
risk factor disclosure).  Specifically, Count_MDA is the natural log of the number of words, 
Resemblance_MDA is the one-year resemblance score, and Fog_MDA is the Fog Index for 
MD&A.  Including the relevant MD&A disclosure measure not only mitigates concerns 
regarding correlated omitted variables, but also allows us to differentiate the characteristics of 
risk factors relative to other disclosures in the 10-K. 
Forward_MDA is the number of forward-looking words in the firm’s MD&A divided by 
the total number of words in the MD&A.  When invoking safe harbor protection, firms typically 
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indicate keywords which identify forward-looking statements.
15
  We read a sample of these 
invoking statements to formulate the list of forward-looking words shown in Appendix B.  Firms 
that provide relatively more forward-looking disclosure, as indicated by the use of these 
keywords, likely have greater incentives to provide meaningful risk factor disclosures.  
ScaledDisclosure is an indicator variable equal to one for firms eligible to adopt the reduced 
disclosure requirements under the Smaller Reporting Company rule or its predecessor, 
Regulation S-B.  Because of scaled reporting for these firms, they may be less likely to provide 
meaningful risk factor disclosures. 
BigN is an indicator variable equal to one for one of the top-tier external auditors.
16
  
Firms that invest in a high quality auditor may be more likely to provide high quality disclosures.  
LogMVE is the natural log of the market value of equity.  Prior research shows that disclosure 
quality is positively related to firm size (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993).  Following Li (2008), 
we control for business risk using growth, as measured by the market-to-book ratio (MTB), and 
complexity of operations using the number of business segments (Segments).  Delaware is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms incorporated in Delaware.  Firms with greater exposure 
to shareholder lawsuits may choose to incorporate in Delaware because it affords more certain 
liability protection for officers and directors (Jagannathan and Pritchard 2013).  This cautious 
attitude may also cause managers of these firms to provide more meaningful risk factors.  We 
include Restructure, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm engaged in restructuring 
                                                 
15
 For example, Parlex Corp.’s 2003 10-K invokes statutory safe harbor protection as follows:  “This document 
includes and incorporates forward-looking statements that are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. All 
statements, other than statements of historical facts included or incorporated in this document, regarding our 
strategy, future operations, financial position and estimated revenues, projected costs, prospects, plans and 
objectives of management are forward-looking statements. When used in this document, the words "will," "believe," 
"anticipate," "intend," "estimate," "expect," "project" and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-
looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words.” 
16
 During our sample period, the top-tier auditors are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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activity, as a control for financing activities that could affect the quality of disclosure.  Finally, 
we include year fixed effects. 
 To examine whether firms’ risk factor disclosures are sensitive to changes in litigation 
risk, we estimate the following regression model: 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11
Disclosure  IncRisk+ DecRisk Disclosure_MDA Forward_MDA
ScaledDisclosure BigN LogMVE MTB
Delaware Restructure Segments
       
   
    
     (4) 
where Disclosure indicates the change in one of the three risk factor disclosure metrics and 
Disclosure_MDA is the change in the respective disclosure metric calculated for the firm’s 
MD&A (exclusive of any risk factor disclosure).  IncRisk (DecRisk) is the change in the 
estimated probability of litigation for positive (negative) changes.  Forward_MDA is the 
change in the number of forward-looking words in the firm’s MD&A divided by the total 
number of words in MD&A.  All other variables are as defined above. 
 To avoid the confounding effects of changes in disclosure associated with the risk factor 
disclosure mandate, we estimate the model separately for the voluntary (1996-2004) and 
mandatory (2006-2010) disclosure periods, excluding the transition period from 2004-2006.  In 
other words, holding the disclosure regime constant, we test whether firms adjust their risk factor 
disclosures in response to changes in litigation risk.  H2 predicts that IncRisk is positively 
(negatively) associated with Count (Resemblance and Fog), with High Risk firms more 
responsive to increases in litigation risk than Low Risk firms.  However, we do not expect the 
opposite proposition to hold; firms are unlikely to change their risk factor disclosure as litigation 
risk decreases.  Thus, we expect the coefficient estimate on DecRisk to be insignificant. 
 To examine whether risk factor disclosures are associated with the market’s assessment 
of firm risk, we estimate the following regression model: 
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t 1 1 t 2 t 3 t
4 t 5 t 6 t 7 t
8 t 9 t 10 t 11 t
Market Risk   Disclosure Disclosure_MDA Forward_MDA
ScaledDisclosure BigN LogMVE MTB
Delaware Restructure Segments MarketRisk
    
   
     
       (5) 
where Market Risk  indicates either Beta, the slope coefficient from a regression of daily returns 
on the CRSP equal-weighted market index, or Std_AbRet, the standard deviation of daily 
abnormal stock returns, both measured over the 250 trading days beginning two days after the 
release of the 10-K for year t.  We include the determinants of risk factor disclosures from 
equation (3) to control for the expected level of disclosure.  We also control for market risk, Beta 
or Std_AbRet, at time t. 
We report results for two alternative specifications of equation (5).  The first specification 
allows Disclosure to vary for High Risk and Low Risk firms to examine how disclosure 
incentives affect the informativeness of  risk factor disclosures for future market-based measures 
of firm risk.  The second specification allows the coefficient estimates on Disclosure to vary with 
both firms’ disclosure incentives (High Risk or Low Risk) and across the disclosure regime 
(Voluntary or Mandatory).  H4 predicts that for High Risk firms Market Riskt+1  is positively 
(negatively) associated with Count (Resemblance and Fog). 
6.  Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables.  Panel A (Panel B) 
compares mean and median values across the High Risk and Low Risk samples for the voluntary 
(mandatory) disclosure period.  In the voluntary disclosure period, Count is significantly higher 
in the High Risk sample and Resemblance and Fog are significantly lower, as predicted.
17
  In the 
                                                 
17
 Note that Fog is undefined for observations with zero word count and Resemblance is undefined for observations 
zero word count in either the current or prior year.  Hence, the number of available observations for these two 
measures is less than the full sample size. 
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mandatory disclosure period, the differences in Count and Resemblance between the High Risk 
and Low Risk samples narrow, with the difference for Resemblance insignificant at the mean.  
More striking, Fog is significantly higher in the High Risk sample. 
In general, the disclosure patterns in MD&A parallel those found in the risk factors; 
specifically, Count_MDA is higher and Resemblance_MDA is lower in the High Risk sample.  It 
is interesting to note, however, that resemblance is uniformly lower for MD&A relative to the 
risk factors, suggesting that firms tend to update MD&A to a much greater extent.  Fog_MDA is 
significantly higher for High Risk firms in both disclosure regimes, suggesting a general 
tendency for these firms to provide more complex disclosures. 
 High Risk firms use more forward-looking words in their MD&A, although the difference 
is significant only in the voluntary disclosure period.  In both periods, a significantly higher 
proportion of the Low Risk sample is eligible for scaled disclosure.  Moreover, the proportion 
increases between the voluntary and mandatory disclosure periods in both the Low Risk and High 
Risk samples, consistent with SEC rules expanding the number of eligible smaller companies.  
Finally, High Risk firms are larger, have higher growth, are more likely to employ a top-tier 
auditor, incorporate in Delaware, and engage in restructuring activity. 
Panel C of Table 2 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the regression variables.  As 
predicted, Risk is positively correlated with Count and negatively correlated with Resemblance 
and Fog, although the correlation with Fog is insignificant.  Count is negatively correlated with 
both Resemblance and Fog, consistent with firms that provide more risk factor disclosure using 
less boilerplate and more readable language.  Count, Resemblance, and Fog are all positively 
correlated with their corresponding MD&A-based disclosure measure, demonstrating that firms 
adopt similar disclosure practices for both risk factors and MD&A.  Forward_MDA is positively 
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correlated with Count but negatively correlated with Resemblance and Fog, suggesting that 
providing relatively more forward-looking information in the MD&A is associated with longer 
risk factor sections that are updated to a greater extent and use more readable language.  Finally, 
larger firms, as indicated by LogMVE and firms not eligible for ScaledDisclosure, and those 
using a top-tier auditor provide more discussion of risk factors and use less readable language. 
6.2 Regression Results 
Our first set of tests examines the association between litigation risk and the properties of 
risk factor disclosures in the voluntary and mandatory disclosure regimes.  Table 3 presents 
results regarding the amount of risk factor disclosure.  In the first specification reported in 
column (1), we find that the amount of risk factor disclosure is increasing in litigation risk, 
consistent with H1a; on average, High Risk firms provide significantly more risk factor 
disclosure than Low Risk firms. 
The results for the control variables indicate that firms providing more risk factor 
disclosure tend to be more verbose in general, as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient estimate on Count_MDA.  Risk factors are also increasing with the amount of 
forward-looking disclosure (Forward_MDA), consistent with the incentives provided by the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor.  Finally, firms with a Big N auditor and firms incorporated in Delaware 
provide significantly more risk factor discussion, while large firms and firms with more business 
segments provide significantly less. 
Findings for the second specification reported in column (2) of Table 3 show that High 
Risk firms disclose significantly more risk factor information in the voluntary disclosure regime, 
consistent with H3a.  High Risk firms continue to be more forthcoming with risk factors in the 
mandatory regime, although the effect of litigation risk on disclosure is significantly reduced 
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(i.e., the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on Risk are equal for the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure periods is rejected at less than the 0.01 level).  This finding supports H3b. 
Table 4 presents analogous results for boilerplate risk factor disclosure.  Consistent with 
H1b, the negative and significant coefficient estimate on Risk in column (1) indicates that High 
Risk firms provide less boilerplate risk factor disclosure.  In column (2), we find that this result 
holds in the voluntary disclosure regime, as predicted in H3a.  However, the positive and 
significant coefficient estimate on Risk_Mandatory in column (2) suggests that High Risk firms 
use significantly more boilerplate language in the mandatory regime, counter to expectations.  
Recall from Figure 2 that Resemblance dropped precipitously for Low Risk firms in 2005 as 
these firms were forced to substantially update their risk factor disclosures to comply with the 
new mandate.  Because Resemblance inherently captures differences in language across two 
years, including 2005 in the analysis could result in spurious inferences for the mandatory 
disclosure period.  Consistent with this conjecture, untabulated robustness tests excluding 2005 
observations reveal that the coefficient estimate on Risk_Mandatory is insignificant while that on 
Risk_Voluntary remains significantly negative.  Thus, within the mandatory disclosure regime, 
this evidence supports the prediction in H3b that there is no statistical difference in boilerplate 
risk factor disclosure between firms with high and low litigation risk following the mandate. 
Table 4 also shows that firms that tend to “cut and paste” risk factor disclosure follow the 
same practice with MD&A, as evident from the positive and significant coefficient estimate on 
Resemblance_MDA.  However, firms update their risk factors significantly more when they 
provide more forward-looking disclosure in their MD&A.  This finding suggests that firms are 
aware of the litigation risk posed by their forward-looking disclosures and take actions to avoid 
boilerplate warnings that are less likely to provide safe harbor protection. 
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We examine the readability of risk factor disclosures in Table 5.  The results in column 
(1) indicate that High Risk firms use more readable language to describe their risk factors, 
consistent with H1c.  This relation holds in both the voluntary and mandatory disclosure periods, 
as shown in column (2), although the results are statistically significant in the voluntary regime 
only.  Taken together, these findings provide support for H3a and H3b.  We also find that the 
readability of risk factor disclosures is positively associated with the readability of MD&A, and 
that providing more forward-looking disclosure is associated with more readable risk factors. 
Overall, the findings indicate that litigation risk provides a significant incentive for firms 
to disclose more meaningful risk factors (i.e., not only more disclosure but also disclosure that is 
less boilerplate and more readable).  Firms that perceived little net benefit to disclosure (i.e., 
firms with low litigation risk) provided less meaningful disclosure on all three dimensions until 
disclosure was required by the SEC.  Even then, firms at greater risk of litigation continue to 
provide significantly more risk factor disclosure, all else equal, suggesting that the mandate did 
not level disclosure practices completely.  In other words, even in a mandatory disclosure 
regime, firm-specific incentives have an important influence on disclosure. 
We examine whether firms change risk factor disclosures in response to changes in 
litigation risk in Table 6.  Focusing first on changes in the amount of disclosure, we find that 
firms disclose significantly more risk factor information as litigation risk increases, as indicated 
by the positive and significant coefficient estimate on IncRisk in both the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure periods.  Untabulated findings reveal that this result is driven by the High 
Risk firms where the coefficient estimate on IncRisk is positive and significant at the 0.06 (0.12) 
level in the voluntary (mandatory) disclosure period.  In contrast, coefficient estimates for the 
Low Risk firms never approach significance at conventional levels.  Thus, consistent with H2, we 
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find that an increase in litigation risk, especially for firms already at a higher risk of being sued, 
is accompanied by an increase in risk factor discussion.  Also consistent with expectations, Table 
6 reveals insignificant results for DecRisk, suggesting that firms do not remove risk factor 
discussion when litigation risk falls.
18
  Regarding the control variables, the positive and 
significant coefficient estimate on Count_MDA indicate that changes in MD&A and risk factor 
disclosure tend to move in tandem.  In addition, changes in forward-looking disclosure in the 
MD&A (Forward_MDA) are positively associated with changes in risk factor disclosure. 
The results in the remaining columns of Table 6 provide no evidence that changes in 
litigation risk are associated with changes in the extent to which risk factor disclosures are 
boilerplate or readable.  However, changes in boilerplate and readability are highly positively 
correlated with Resemblance_MDA and Fog_MDA, respectively, providing further evidence 
of correlated disclosure tendencies within firms’ periodic filings. 
Table 7 presents results for tests of the association between the amount of risk factor 
disclosure and the market’s assessment of future firm risk.  Pooling across disclosure regime, the 
findings reveal that Count is significantly positively associated with Betat+1 (column (1)) and 
Std_AbRett+1 (column (3)) for High Risk firms only; there is no evidence of an association 
between risk factor disclosure and investors’ risk assessments for firms with low litigation risk.19  
These results are consistent with the evidence presented above showing that firms at greater risk 
of litigation provide more meaningful risk factor disclosures. 
                                                 
18
 We present results controlling for disclosure regime although we do not have any a priori reason to expect that the 
regime affects the sensitivity of risk factor disclosure to changes in litigation risk.  Untabulated results reveal that the 
coefficient estimates on IncRisk and DecRisk are not significantly different between the voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure periods. 
19
 Untabulated results indicate that the correlation is low between ex-ante litigation risk and either Betat+1 ( = 0.24) 
or Std_AbRett+1 (=0.10).  This can also be seen in our litigation risk model reported in Appendix A; these 
covariates are significantly associated with contemporaneous lawsuit filings in only two of the nine years in the 
voluntary disclosure period.  Thus, there is no evidence of a mechanical association between litigation risk and 
either systematic or idiosyncratic firm risk. 
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Columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 present results from a specification which allows the 
coefficient estimate on Count to vary for High Risk and Low Risk firms across the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure regimes.  In the voluntary disclosure regime, the findings indicate that the 
coefficient estimate on CountHighRisk is positive and significant for both market-based measures of 
future firm risk.  In stark contrast, the coefficient estimate on CountLowRisk is negative, and 
significantly so with Std_AbRett+1 as the dependent variable.  Moreover, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient estimates for the High Risk and Low Risk samples are equal is rejected at less than 
the 0.01 level.  Thus, consistent with H4, High Risk firms provide significantly more informative 
risk factor disclosures in the voluntary disclosure regime. 
In the mandatory disclosure regime, the coefficient estimates for High Risk and Low Risk 
firms are both significantly positive (insignificant) in the regression with Std_AbRett+1 (Betat+1) 
as the dependent variable.  However, in both regressions, tests of coefficient differences are 
insignificant at conventional levels.  Thus, consistent with the findings in our previous tests, the 
evidence is consistent with a convergence in the meaningfulness of risk factors after the 
disclosure mandate. 
In additional untabulated analysis, we include Resemblance and Fog in the estimation of 
equation (5).  Risk factor disclosures that are more boilerplate or less readable may be less 
informative to investors about future firm risk.  We find, however, that the coefficients on these 
alternative risk factor disclosure metrics are insignificant.  To further test the robustness of our 
results, we re-estimate the regressions in columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 substituting the change 
in the dependent variable for the level of the dependent variable with no change in inferences.  
We also implement a two-stage regression approach, where in the first stage we estimate the 
determinants model in equation (3) for Count (including the lagged value of Count as an 
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additional explanatory variable).  We then estimate a regression of Betat+1 or Std_AbRett+1 on 
this residual.  Findings from both of these second stage estimations are consistent with our 
primary tests. 
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
Risk factors disclosure has steadily increased, both in absolute terms and as a proportion 
of MD&A, since Congress adopted the PSLRA in 1995, and continuing with the SEC’s 2005 
mandate.  Risk factors now represent a substantial part of firms’ annual securities filings.  In this 
paper, we assess the effects of this shift from a voluntary incentive to a disclosure mandate.  
Consistent with predictions, we find that prior to the SEC’s 2005 mandate, firms with 
high securities litigation risk disclose more risk factors, revise their disclosure more from year-
to-year, and use language that is easier to read.  These findings are consistent with litigation risk 
providing an incentive for firms to voluntarily disclose risk factors that are more likely to be 
viewed as “meaningful” by the courts.  With the advent of the SEC’s mandate, these differences 
in disclosure largely disappear, although firms at higher risk of litigation continue to provide a 
greater amount of risk factor disclosure. 
We also find that firms are sensitive to changes in litigation risk, but that this sensitivity 
is asymmetric.  Firms experiencing an increase in litigation risk increase the amount of risk 
factor disclosure, but we do not find a corresponding decrease in disclosure when litigation risk 
declines.  Moreover, this sensitivity is only displayed by high risk firms; we find no evidence 
that low risk firms are sensitive to changes in their litigation exposure.   
Finally, we find that risk factor disclosures by firms at high risk of litigation are 
positively associated post-disclosure measures of firm risk, consistent with investors 
incorporating this information into their risk assessments.  For low litigation risk firms, the 
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association is insignificant, suggesting that disclosures by these firms convey little useful 
information.  This difference is pronounced in the voluntary disclosure regime, but like our other 
results largely converges subsequent to the SEC’s mandate. 
Overall, we conclude from the evidence presented in this paper that firms with high 
litigation risk use risk factor disclosure in an effort to mitigate the expected costs of litigation. 
The SEC’s introduction of a risk factor mandate induced substantial convergence in risk factor 
disclosure by firms at low risk of litigation.  Nevertheless, the incentive to provide meaningful 
risk factor disclosure provided by the PSLRA may continue to affect disclosure decisions and the 
usefulness of risk factor disclosure for investors, at least for firms at high risk of securities fraud 
class actions.  This paper contributes to our understanding of the roles of incentives and 
regulation in the evolution of narrative corporate disclosures, and its consequences for investors.  
The SEC’s mandate in 2005 led to substantial convergence in risk factors disclosure, but scholars 
studying risk factor disclosure should be cognizant of the complementary role of legal incentives 
and regulatory mandates on disclosure decisions.  
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Appendix A 
Estimation of Firm-Specific Litigation Risk 
 
 We estimate the probability of litigation for each firm-year using the following model: 

















sElectronicRetailSoftware
HardwareBiotechTurnoverSkewness
Std_RetMin_RetCum_RetBetaSize
F  1)  (Lawsuit Prob
121110
9876
54321
      (A1) 
For notational convenience, we suppress year and firm subscripts. 
 Lawsuit is equal to one if the firm was a defendant in a class action securities lawsuit 
during the year, and zero otherwise.
20
  We use data from the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse to identify sued firms.  Size is the natural log of the average of market value of 
common equity.  Beta is the slope coefficient from a regression of daily returns on the CRSP 
equal-weighted market index.  Cum_Ret is the cumulative daily return.  Min_Ret is the minimum 
one day return.  Std_Ret is the standard deviation of daily returns.  Skewness is the skewness of 
the daily returns.  Turnover is the proportion of shares traded, measured as 1 – (1 – Turn)X, 
where Turn is the average daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding and 
X is the number of trading days.
21
  Prior research finds that Size, Beta, Std_Ret, and Turnover are 
positively associated with lawsuit filings, while Cum_Ret, Min_Ret, and Skewness are negatively 
associated with lawsuit filings.  Finally, the model includes indicator variables for firms in five 
industries generally believed to be at higher risk of litigation than other industries, specifically 
Biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836), computer Hardware (SIC codes 3570–3577), computer 
Software (SIC codes 7371–7379), Retail (SIC codes 5200–5961), and Electronics (SIC codes 
3600–3674).  To the extent the firm-specific variables in the model do not capture cross-
                                                 
20
 We exclude lawsuits arising out of public offerings as the legal standards applicable to such lawsuits are 
substantially different and the PSLRA safe harbor does not apply to statements made in connection with initial 
public offerings. 
21
 We divide daily trading volume for NASDAQ stocks by two to take into account differences in the way trading 
volume is reported on NASDAQ as opposed to NYSE and AMEX. 
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sectional variation in litigation risk for firms in these industries, we expect the coefficient 
estimates on the industry indicator variables to be positive. 
 Table A1, Panel A reports summary statistics from the annual regressions of the litigation 
risk model for the voluntary disclosure period, 1996-2004.  Coefficient estimates on four of the 
variables – Size, Cum_Ret, Min_Ret, and Turnover – are significant in the predicted direction in 
all nine annual estimations.  The remaining firm-specific risk variables – Beta, Std_Ret, and 
Skewness – have coefficient estimates that are consistent with predictions in most of the annual 
estimations, but are generally not significant at the 0.05 level.  The results for the industry 
indicator variables indicate that industry membership is not a significant determinant of litigation 
risk incremental to firm-specific factors. 
 Table A1, Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the estimated probability of litigation, 
ranked in deciles by year and pooled across years.  Overall, the probability of litigation ranges 
from 0.000 to 0.992, with a mean (median) of 0.023 (0.007).  The results reveal, however, that 
litigation risk is concentrated in the highest decile of firms.
22
  The mean (median) estimated 
litigation risk in decile 10 is 0.131 (0.096), approximately three times higher than the mean 
(median) for decile 9.  This evidence illustrates the highly skewed nature of the distribution of 
firms’ litigation risk.  In any given year, most firms face little or no risk of a securities fraud 
class action.  Untabulated results for the estimation of the litigation risk model for the mandatory 
disclosure period, 2005-2010, yield similar inferences to those reported in Table A1. 
 
                                                 
22
 Because deciles are formed for each year, the maximum estimated litigation risk in a decile can exceed the 
minimum in higher deciles. 
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Table A1 
Estimation of Litigation Risk for the Voluntary Disclosure Period, 1996-2004 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Summary Statistics from Annual Logistic Estimations of Litigation Risk Model 
 
 
Variable 
 
Prediction 
Mean Coefficient 
Estimate 
# positive / 
# negative 
 
# significant
a 
Intercept ? –5.10 0 / 9 9 
Size + 0.14 9 / 0 9 
Beta + 0.01 6 / 3 2 
Cum_Ret – –0.40 0 / 9 9 
Min_Ret – –3.08 0 / 9 9 
Std_Ret + –0.34 6 / 3 2 
Skewness – –0.03 2 / 7 2 
Turnover + 1.05 9 / 0 9 
Biotechnology + –0.48 5 / 4 0 
Computer Hardware + 0.05 5 / 4 1 
Computer Software + 0.03 4 / 5 1 
Electronics + 0.02 4 / 5 0 
Retail + –0.09 2 / 7 0 
     
Mean Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.27    
Mean N 6,471    
 
Panel B:  Litigation Risk, Ranked in Deciles by Year 
 
Decile N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
1 5,819 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2 5,826 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 
3 5,825 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 
4 5,826 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 
5 5,820 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.010 
6 5,826 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.015 
7 5,826 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.002 0.024 
8 5,825 0.022 0.023 0.007 0.004 0.036 
9 5,826 0.038 0.038 0.013 0.008 0.076 
10 5,819 0.131 0.096 0.105 0.022 0.992 
       
Total 58,238 0.023 0.007 0.051 0.000 0.992 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Estimation of Litigation Risk for the Voluntary Disclosure Period, 1996-2004 
 
The litigation risk model estimated in Panel A is as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12
Size Beta Cum_Ret Min_Ret Std_Ret
Prob (Lawsuit  1)  F Skewness Turnover Biotech Hardware
Software Retail Electronics
     
   
   
     
      
     
 
where Lawsuit is equal to one if the firm was a defendant in a class action securities lawsuit during the year, and 
zero otherwise.  Size is the natural log of the average of market value of common equity.  Beta is the slope 
coefficient from a regression of daily returns on the CRSP equal-weighted market index.  Cum_Ret is the cumulative 
daily return.  Min_Ret is the minimum one day return.  Std_Ret is standard deviation of daily returns.  Skewness is 
the skewness of the daily returns.  Turnover is the proportion of shares traded, measured as 1 – (1 – Turn)X, where 
Turn is the average daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding and X is the number of 
trading days.  The high risk industry indicator variables represent Biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836), computer 
Hardware (SIC codes 3570–3577), computer Software (SIC codes 7371–7379), Retail (SIC codes 5200–5961), and 
Electronics (SIC codes 3600–3674). 
a
  Significant in the predicted direction at the 0.05 level or better.  Tests for all explanatory variables are one-sided; 
tests for the intercept are two-sided. 
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Appendix B 
Forward-Looking Words 
 
 
Word Frequency Word Frequency 
Aim/aims 0.02% Ongoing 0.82% 
Anticipate/anticipates 1.23 Optimism/optimistic 0.03 
Believe/believes 4.14 Outlook 0.35 
Can/could 9.50 Pessimistic 0.01 
Continue 3.36 Plan/plans 5.41 
Contraction 0.03 Possible/possibility 0.74 
Decline 2.28 Potential 1.85 
Estimate/estimates 5.93 Predict/predicts/prediction 0.43 
Expand/expansion 1.80 Probable/probability 0.71 
Expect/expects/expectation 3.38 Project/projects/projection 2.92 
Forecast/forecasts 0.50 Prospect/prospects 0.20 
Future 9.52 See/sees 3.19 
Goal 0.17 Seek/seeks 0.50 
Grow/growth 4.37 Should 1.62 
Hope/hopeful 0.03 Shrink 0.06 
Intend/intends/intention 0.72 Target/targets 0.43 
Look/looking 1.87 Trend/trends 1.12 
May/might 12.54 Upbeat 0.01 
Next 0.96 View/views 0.23 
Objective 0.22 Will/would 16.80 
 
This table reports forward-looking words used to invoke safe harbor protection identified from a search of 10-K 
filings and the relative frequency (in percentage terms) of these words in the sample firms’ MD&A.
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Figure 1 
Word Count of Risk Factors by Year 
 
Panel A:  Word count 
 
Panel B:  Relative to MD&A
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Word Count of Risk Factors by Year 
 
This figure presents the median word count of risk factors (Panel A) and the median ratio of the word count of risk 
factors divided by the word count of MD&A (Panel B) for the High and Low Risk samples.  
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Figure 2 
Resemblance Score of Risk Factors by Year 
 
Panel A:  Resemblance score  
 
Panel B:  Relative to MD&A 
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FIGURE 2 (continued) 
Resemblance Score of Risk Factors by Year 
 
This figure presents the median resemblance score of risk factors (Panel A) and the median ratio of the resemblance 
score of risk factors divided by the resemblance score of MD&A exclusive of any risk factor language (Panel B) for 
the High and Low Risk samples.  The resemblance score is calculated as
S(A) S(B)
S(A) S(B)


, where S(A) is the set of 
word trigrams (i.e., sequence of three adjacent words) in the reference document A and S(B) is the set of trigrams in 
the comparison document B.  The figure shows one-year resemblance scores, i.e., a comparison of risk factor 
disclosures for firm i in year t relative to year t – 1. 
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Figure 3 
Fog Index of Risk Factors by Year 
 
Panel A:  Fog index 
 
Panel B:  Relative to MD&A 
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FIGURE 3 (continued) 
Fog Index of Risk Factors by Year 
 
This figure presents the median Fog Index of risk factors (Panel A) and the median ratio of the Fog Index for risk 
factors divided by the Fog Index for MD&A exclusive of any risk factor language (Panel B) for the High and Low 
Risk samples.  The Fog Index indicates the number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence 
would need to understand the text after reading it once, and is calculated as (words per sentence + percentage of 
complex words) × 0.40, where complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more. 
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Table 1 
Sample Observations by Litigation Risk Decile 
 
 
 
Litigation Risk 
Decile 
Voluntary Disclosure Period 
(1996-2004) 
 Mandatory Disclosure Period 
(2005-2010) 
Low Risk High Risk  Low Risk High Risk 
1 117 31  46 27 
2 137 44  47 24 
3 104 51  34 26 
4 85 69  28 23 
5 57 79  18 28 
6 37 95  18 39 
7  120  9 37 
8  132  11 60 
9  189  6 57 
10  267  4 77 
      
Total 537 1,077  221 398 
 
This table reports the number of observations in each litigation risk decile.  The sample is constructed by first 
estimating firm-specific litigation risk annually for each year of the voluntary disclosure period (1996-2004) using 
the model specified in equation (A1) of the Appendix.  High Risk firms are defined as those that rank in decile 10 in 
at least one year in the voluntary disclosure period.  Low Risk firms are defined as those that never rank above decile 
6 in any year in the voluntary disclosure period.  A random sample of 181 (112) High Risk (Low Risk) firms is 
selected, representing approximately 5% of the firms in each risk group.  The sample is then followed through the 
mandatory disclosure period (2005-2010).
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A:  Distributional Statistics – Voluntary Disclosure Period 
 
   
Low Risk 
  
High Risk 
 Test of Differences 
p-value 
Variable  Nobs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  Nobs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median 
              
Count  537 5.03 5.48 2.57  1,077 7.04 7.72 1.91  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Resemblance  345 0.70 0.78 0.28  863 0.55 0.59 0.28  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Fog  445 24.22 22.98 5.67  1,041 23.49 21.42 7.54  0.04 < 0.01 
Count_MDA  537 7.92 7.88 0.72  1,077 8.60 8.60 0.69  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Resemblance_MDA  345 0.34 0.36 0.12  863 0.32 0.32 0.13  0.02 0.01 
Fog_MDA  445 18.46 18.38 1.55  1,041 19.28 19.22 1.47  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA  537 0.01 0.01 0.01  1,077 0.02 0.02 0.01  < 0.01 < 0.01 
ScaledDisclosure  537 0.13 0.00 0.33  1,077 0.05 0.00 0.22  < 0.01 < 0.01 
BigN  524 0.86 1.00 0.35  1,040 0.90 1.00 0.31  0.04 0.03 
LogMVE  524 4.05 3.93 1.48  1,040 5.76 5.72 2.20  < 0.01 < 0.01 
MTB  524 2.34 1.49 3.56  1,039 3.19 2.52 8.60  0.01 < 0.01 
Delaware  524 0.47 0.00 0.50  1,040 0.72 1.00 0.45  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Restructure  524 0.06 0.00 0.24  1,040 0.17 0.00 0.37  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Segments  524 1.79 1.00 1.18  1,040 1.79 1.00 1.47  0.61 < 0.01 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel B:  Distributional Statistics – Mandatory Disclosure Period 
 
   
Low Risk 
  
High Risk 
 Test of Differences 
p-value 
Variable  Nobs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  Nobs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median 
              
Count  221 7.39 7.87 1.91  398 8.50 8.59 0.57  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Resemblance  220 0.63 0.75 0.30  397 0.62 0.64 0.20  0.62 < 0.01 
Fog  220 20.75 20.85 5.88  398 21.83 21.67 2.19  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Count_MDA  221 8.71 8.69 0.55  398 9.22 9.26 0.46  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Resemblance_MDA  220 0.43 0.43 0.10  397 0.39 0.39 0.10  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Fog_MDA  220 19.23 18.98 1.49  398 20.22 20.26 1.22  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA  221 0.02 0.02 0.01  398 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.17 0.35 
ScaledDisclosure  221 0.31 0.00 0.46  398 0.09 0.00 0.28  0.01 < 0.01 
BigN  218 0.56 1.00 0.50  391 0.83 1.00 0.38  < 0.01 < 0.01 
LogMVE  218 4.64 4.43 1.43  391 6.63 6.83 2.08  < 0.01 < 0.01 
MTB  218 1.94 1.50 1.89  391 2.71 2.04 6.39  0.41 < 0.01 
Delaware  218 0.46 0.00 0.50  391 0.76 1.00 0.43  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Restructure  218 0.16 0.00 0.36  391 0.41 0.00 0.49  < 0.01 < 0.01 
Segments  218 1.16 1.00 0.64  391 1.23 1.00 0.86  0.26 0.66 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel C:  Pearson Correlation Matrix 
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Resemblance –0.13              
Fog –0.24 0.09             
Risk 0.36 –0.17 –0.01            
Count_MDA 0.60 –0.19 –0.03 0.38           
Resemblance_MDA 0.15 0.42 –0.12 –0.12 0.06          
Fog_MDA 0.40 –0.11 0.06 0.24 0.50 0.10         
Forward_MDA 0.31 –0.09 –0.12 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.18        
ScaledDisclosure –0.08 0.05 –0.16 –0.19 –0.19 0.06 –0.07 –0.04       
BigN 0.10 –0.04 0.10 0.14 0.12 –0.07 0.06 0.09 –0.39      
LogMVE 0.27 –0.10 0.09 0.39 0.48 –0.07 0.29 0.07 –0.35 0.34     
MTB 0.02 0.02 –0.01 0.11 –0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.01 –0.00 0.19    
Delaware 0.18 –0.06 0.02 0.26 0.22 –0.03 0.12 0.03 –0.09 0.09 0.18 0.04   
Restructure 0.24 –0.06 –0.06 0.18 0.39 –0.03 0.20 0.02 –0.07 0.07 0.21 –0.03 0.12  
Segments –0.08 –0.08 0.11 0.00 0.14 –0.19 0.01 –0.09 –0.10 0.04 0.10 –0.08 0.03 0.09 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the Low Risk and High Risk samples in the voluntary (1996-2004) (Panel A) and mandatory (2005-2010) (Panel B) disclosure 
periods.  Risk is and indicator variable equal to one (zero) for High (Low) Risk firms; Count is the natural log of the number of words in the risk factor disclosure; 
Resemblance is calculated as
S(A) S(B)
S(A) S(B)


, where S(A) and S(B) are the set of trigrams (a sequence of three adjacent words in a sentence) in texts A and B; Fog is the 
number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence would need to understand the text after reading it once, and is calculated as (words per sentence + 
percentage of complex words) × 0.40, where complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more; Count_MDA , Resemblance_MDA, and Fog_MDA are 
calculated in an analogous fashion using MD&A, exclusive of any risk factor disclosure; Forward_MDA is the number of forward-looking words in the firm’s MD&A 
(identified in Appendix B), divided by the total number of words in MD&A; ScaledDisclosure is an indicator variable equal to one for firms able to adopt the reduced 
disclosure requirements under the Smaller Reporting Company rule or its predecessor, Regulation S-B; BigN equals one if the firm is audited by a top-tier auditor, and 
zero otherwise; LogMVE is the natural log of the market value of equity; MTB is the market value of the firm divided by the book value of common equity; Delaware 
equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware, and zero otherwise; Restructure equals one if the firm engaged in restructuring activity, and zero otherwise; and 
Segments is the number of reported business segments. 
Pearson correlations in Panel C significant at or below the 0.01 level (two-tailed) in Panel C are highlighted in boldface font.  All reported p-values are two-tailed.
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Table 3 
Association between Amount of Risk Factor Disclosure and Litigation Risk 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Count 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Variable 
Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
Risk 1.14 < 0.01    
Risk_Voluntary    1.31 < 0.01 
Risk_Mandatory    0.67 < 0.01 
Count_MDA 0.71 < 0.01  0.74 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA 62.82 < 0.01  61.22 < 0.01 
ScaledDisclosure 0.09 0.48  0.08 0.54 
BigN 0.57 < 0.01  0.62 < 0.01 
LogMVE –0.06 < 0.01  –0.07 < 0.01 
MTB 0.01 0.09  0.00 0.08 
Delaware 0.17 0.03  0.17 0.02 
Restructure –0.12 0.23  –0.09 0.37 
Segments –0.14 < 0.01  –0.14 < 0.01 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes  
      
Adj. R
2 
0.95   0.95  
Nobs. 2,174   2,174  
      
p-value for Voluntary = Mandatory:    
    Risk     < 0.01 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  The voluntary (mandatory) disclosure period is 1996-2004 (2005-2010).  All 
reported p-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 4 
Association between Boilerplate Risk Factor Disclosure and Litigation Risk 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Resemblance 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Variable 
Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
Risk –0.05 < 0.01    
Risk_Voluntary    –0.13 < 0.01 
Risk_Mandatory    0.07 < 0.01 
Resemblance_MDA 1.23 < 0.01  1.19 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA –3.74 < 0.01  –3.73 < 0.01 
ScaledDisclosure 0.07 < 0.01  0.06 < 0.01 
BigN 0.04 0.04  0.02 0.37 
LogMVE 0.01 < 0.01  0.01 < 0.01 
MTB –0.00 0.21  –0.00 0.21 
Delaware –0.00 0.95  –0.00 0.81 
Restructure 0.00 0.81  –0.01 0.73 
Segments 0.00 0.56  0.00 0.86 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes  
      
Adj. R
2 
0.86   0.86  
Nobs. 1,780   1,780  
      
p-value for Voluntary = Mandatory:    
    Risk     < 0.01 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  The voluntary (mandatory) disclosure period is 1996-2004 (2005-2010).  All 
reported p-values are two-tailed.  
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Table 5 
Association between Readability of Risk Factor Disclosure and Litigation Risk 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Fog 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Variable 
Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
Risk –1.41 < 0.01    
Risk_Voluntary    –1.84 < 0.01 
Risk_Mandatory    –0.36 0.53 
Fog_MDA 1.10 < 0.01  1.07 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA –155.36 < 0.01  –151.63 < 0.01 
ScaledDisclosure –1.66 < 0.01  –1.62 < 0.01 
BigN 0.29 0.51  0.17 0.70 
LogMVE 0.28 < 0.01  0.29 < 0.01 
MTB –0.02 0.58  –0.02 0.58 
Delaware 0.12 0.69  0.12 0.70 
Restructure –0.99 0.01  –1.05 < 0.01 
Segments 0.23 0.05  0.23 0.05 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes  
      
Adj. R
2 
0.93   0.93  
Nobs. 2,049   2,049  
      
p-value for Voluntary = Mandatory:    
    Risk     0.02 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  The voluntary (mandatory) disclosure period is 1996-2004 (2005-2010).  All 
reported p-values are two-tailed.
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Table 6 
Association between Changes in Risk Factor Disclosure and Changes in Litigation Risk 
 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Count  Resemblance  Fog 
 
Variable 
Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
 
p-value 
IncRisk_Voluntary 1236.69 0.05  0.16 0.40  0.95 0.75 
IncRisk_Mandatory 6844.22 0.09  –0.62 0.26  –12.70 0.16 
DecRisk_Voluntary 397.11 0.63  –0.18 0.46  –3.63 0.35 
DecRisk_Mandatory 1694.59 0.70  –0.50 0.11  –2.64 0.60 
Count_MDA 0.18 < 0.01       
Resemblance_MDA    0.99 < 0.01    
Fog_MDA       0.61 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA 399.62 < 0.01  –0.00 < 0.01  –0.00 0.13 
ScaledDisclosure –58.36 0.55  –0.01 0.75  –0.40 0.39 
BigN 52.70 0.50  0.00 0.94  –0.31 0.39 
LogMVE 16.50 0.23  0.00 0.92  –0.03 0.57 
MTB 6.57 0.34  –0.01 0.74  –0.02 0.59 
Delaware 66.26 0.26  –0.01 0.82  0.07 0.78 
Restructure –117.11 0.13  0.01 0.66  –0.06 0.87 
Segments –34.62 0.12  –0.01 0.06  –0.01 0.92 
         
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
         
Adj. R
2 
0.16   0.15   0.01  
Nobs. 1,645   1,520   1,765  
         
 
Count is the change in the number of words in the risk factor disclosure; Resemblance is the change in the 
Resemblance score; Fog is the change in the fog score; number of words in the MD&A;  Count_MDA , 
Resemblance_MDA, and Fog_MDA are calculated in an analogous fashion using MD&A, exclusive of any risk 
factor disclosure;  IncRisk (DecRisk) is the change in the estimated probability of litigation for positive (negative) 
changes in litigation risk; Forward_MDA is the change in the ratio of forward-looking words in the firm’s MD&A 
to the total number of words in MD&A.  All other variables are defined in Table 2.  To avoid the confounding 
effects of changes in disclosure associated with the risk factor disclosure mandate, we exclude the transition period 
from 2004-2006.  Hence, the voluntary (mandatory) disclosure period is 1996-2004 (2006-2010). All reported p-
values are two-tailed.
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Table 7 
Risk Factor Disclosures and Future Market-Based Measures of Firm Risk 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Betat+1  Dependent Variable = Std_AbRett+1 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable Coeff. Est. p-value  Coeff. Est. p-value  Coeff. Est. p-value  Coeff. Est. p-value 
CountHighRisk 0.0369 0.01     0.0008 < 0.01    
CountLowRisk 0.0120 0.21     –0.0003 0.40    
CountHighRisk_Voluntary    0.0435 < 0.01     0.0006 0.05 
CountHighRisk_Mandatory    0.0142 0.48     0.0018 < 0.01 
CountLowRisk_Voluntary    –0.0020 0.85     –0.0010 < 0.01 
CountLowRisk_Mandatory    0.0162 0.45     0.0014 0.04 
Count_MDA 0.0275 0.01  0.0287  0.01  0.0044 < 0.01  0.0046 < 0.01 
Forward_MDA 0.0199 0.38  0.0164 0.47  –0.0001 0.91  0.0001 0.98 
ScaledDisclosure 0.0103 0.85  –0.0027 0.96  0.0079 < 0.01  0.0085 < 0.01 
BigN –0.0250 0.57  0.0024 0.70  –0.0039 < 0.01  –0.0036 0.01 
LogMVE 0.0293 < 0.01  0.0278 < 0.01  –0.0035 < 0.01  –0.0036 < 0.01 
MTB 0.0133 < 0.01  0.0137 < 0.01  0.0001 0.40  0.0001 0.40 
Delaware 0.0149 0.63  0.0154 0.61  0.0001 0.94  0.0001 0.96 
Restructure 0.0782 0.06  0.0958 0.02  –0.0017 0.19  –0.0014 0.30 
Segments –0.0114 0.36  –0.0116 0.35  –0.0006 0.13  –0.0006 0.11 
Betat 0.4934 < 0.01  0.4722 < 0.01       
Std_AbRett       0.6004 < 0.01  0.5922 < 0.01 
            
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
            
Adj. R
2 
0.79   0.79   0.85   0.85  
Nobs. 2,015   2,015   1,949   1,949  
            
p-value for CountHighRisk = CountLowRisk:          
    Pooled  < 0.01      < 0.01    
    Voluntary     < 0.01      < 0.01 
    Mandatory     0.79      0.14 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Risk Factor Disclosures and Future Market-Based Measures of Firm Risk 
 
Betat+1 is the slope coefficient from a regression of daily returns on the CRSP equal-weighted market index and Std_AbRett+1 is the standard deviation of daily 
abnormal stock returns, both measured over the 250 trading days beginning two days after the release of the 10-K.  CountHighRisk (CountLowRisk) is the natural log 
of the number of words in the risk factor disclosure for High Risk (Low Risk) firms.  All other variables are defined in Table 2.  The voluntary (mandatory) 
disclosure period is 1996-2004 (2005-2010).  All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
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